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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No.  08-3487
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                                
v.
RODNEY AARON BLACKMAN,
                                                   Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No.  08-cr-00147)
District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 11, 2009
Before: McKEE, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 26, 2009)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Rodney Blackman pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and three counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(d).  The District Court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 150 months
imprisonment, a term of supervised release of three years, restitution of $66,894, and a
special assessment of $600.   
Blackman filed a timely appeal, and counsel for Blackman moved to withdraw
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  After receiving a copy of his
counsel’s request to withdraw, Blackman submitted a pro se brief in response.  For the
reasons set forth below, we will grant counsel’s motion and dismiss the appeal.
When counsel files a motion pursuant to Anders, we determine whether: (1)
counsel adequately fulfilled the Anders requirements, and (2) an independent review of
the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780
(3d Cir. 2000).
To meet the first prong, appointed counsel must examine the record, conclude that
there are no nonfrivolous issues for review, and request permission to withdraw.  United
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Counsel must accompany a motion to
withdraw with a “brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim,
3but must, at a minimum, meet the “conscientious examination” standard set forth in
Anders.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.
Blackman’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw along with an Anders brief,
asserting that he “conducted a conscientious examination of the record” and concluding
that no appealable issues exist because Blackman cannot claim that: (1) the District Court
did not have jurisdiction; or (2) his sentence was unreasonable.  
Blackman’s counsel concedes that the District Court had jurisdiction over
Blackman despite Blackman’s claim that federal courts cannot exercise criminal
jurisdiction over any defendant.  All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, derive
their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority to “ordain and establish”
inferior courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution.  The
Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power “of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive.”  Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 509
(1916).
Blackman was charged under federal criminal law, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). 
Congress granted district courts criminal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, which
provides, “The district courts of the United States . . . have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”  Because
Congress has the power to confer jurisdiction on the district courts under Article III, § 1,
 The District Court denied the Government’s request to amend the Guidelines1
calculation based on its perceived lack of acceptance of responsibility from Blackman. 
Blackman’s counsel requested a motion for downward departure based on Blackman’s
extensive mental health background and for his exceptional acceptance of responsibility,
as demonstrated by his confessions to multiple bank robberies immediately upon his
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and chose to do so by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3231, Blackman cannot claim that the federal
district court lacked jurisdiction over his violation of federal law.  Blackman’s courtroom
utterances that no jurisdiction existed and his filings making the same claims were based
on nonsensical documents and guidance which are regrettably circulated among, and
occasionally filed by, inmates.  We agree that no nonfrivolous appeal exists on this issue.
Blackman’s counsel also concedes that Blackman’s sentence was reasonable.  We
review a district court’s sentence for reasonableness, evaluating both its procedural and
substantive underpinnings, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v.
United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).  In imposing a sentence, the District Court
must: (1) correctly determine, as a matter of fact, and as a matter of law, the proper
Guidelines sentence; (2) correctly determine the applicability of any departure motions;
and (3) exercise its discretion to determine the applicability of any of the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors.  See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, Blackman does not contend that the District Court improperly calculated his
Guidelines range or failed to rule on any departure motions; rather he argues that his
sentence was unreasonable.  Counsel concedes first that the District Court correctly
calculated Blackman’s Guidelines range and properly ruled on any departure motions.    1
interview with the FBI.  The District Court denied this motion, but specifically noted that
it would take these factors into consideration at sentencing.  
 When explaining its judgment, the District Court explicitly noted that2
“[Blackman’s] father was physically abusive of his mother, with the Defendant
intervening on behalf of his mother, leaving mental scars.  His father was an alcoholic
and a drug abuser.  And the Defendant himself has had innumerable mental health
problems, including suffering from bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and psychosis.” 
Additionally, the Court expressly took notice of Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility
and demonstrated remorse.
5
After correctly calculating Blackman’s Guidelines range and properly considering all
departure motions, the District Court found Blackman’s Guidelines range to be 188 to
235 months.
The Court then allowed both parties to address the appropriate sentence in light of
the requested variances and other sentencing factors.  Blackman also personally addressed
the Court and requested a sentence of 144 months.  In imposing a 150-month sentence –
38 months below the bottom of the Guidelines range – the Court reviewed the § 3553(a)
factors extensively, clearly indicated its consideration of those factors, and imposed its
sentence in light of those factors.2
In light of the District Court’s careful consideration of Blackman’s mental history
and acceptance of responsibility, along with the seriousness of the crime, we agree with
Blackman’s counsel that this would be a frivolous issue on appeal.
As for the second prong of Anders, we have independently reviewed the record
and we agree with counsel’s comprehensive analysis as to why no appealable issue exists. 
6The District Court properly held that it had jurisdiction over this criminal case, and did
not abuse its discretion in sentencing Blackman.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and, in a separate
order, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders.
